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Abstract
We analyse the relationship between two kinds of tax and equilibrium de-
terminacy in an economy with government expenditure used for utility. We
assume that the income tax rate depends on the level of income itself and
that the tax rate of consumption is constant. This describes a realistic tax
system which resonates in many countries. Our model complements similar
extant research, but we extend the literature by theoretically showing that
the expansion of policy types can decrease the risk of instability when one
condition slightly changes.
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tion tax, government expenditure on utility.
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1 Introduction
We analyse the e®ect of two kinds of tax, income and consumption, on the
stability (equilibrium determinacy) of an economy.
We consider a model in which households bene¯t from government ex-
penditure. As Kamiguchi and Tamai (2011) show, an important factor of
determinacy is a revenue source for providing public services rather than the
presence of productive government spending, 1 and this setting has already
been researched in many studies. Guo and Harrison (2008) and Hori and
Maebayashi (2013) claim that externality of government expenditure on util-
ity is signi¯cant determinants macroeconomic stability. However, they pos-
tulate constant tax rates. Chen and Guo (2016, 2017) assume endogenous
growth, the government expenditure on the utility and the income tax rate
can depend on the level of income itself as in Guo and Lansing (1998). They
demonstrate that government expenditure on utility does not a®ect equilib-
rium determinacy. In addition, they show that regressive tax is preferable for
ensuring a stable economy, which contrasts with Guo and Lansing's (1998)
real business cycle model analysis with increasing returns in production.
We assume the income tax rate is a function of income as in Guo and
Lansing (1998) with a constant tax rate of consumption. This is empirically
credible based on the tax system as in Japan and other countries. As McK-
night (2016) notes, many countries shift from direct to indirect taxation,
and he shows that consumption taxes are more desirable than income taxes
in view of equilibrium determinacy with interest-rate control type monetary
policy. We extend the study of Chen and Guo (2014) by appending the con-
sumption tax rate while maintaining their approach to income tax in this
regard to Guo and Lansing (1998), public spending on utility and physical
capital and labour in the production function. Our model can also interpret
the case where the variable income tax rate is added to Hori and Maebayashi
(2013). Our results complement these foregoing studies in that their results
are reasonably robust even if another kind of tax is levied. For example,
equilibrium is necessarily determinate if government expenditure and private
consumption are substitutes. However, the expansion of policy mechanisms
can decrease the risk of instability under the speci¯c policy setting when one
condition slightly changes. Under some situations, consumption taxes do not
serve to satisfy the equilibrium condition and thus the self-ful¯lling expecta-
tion does not hold; this results in economic stability in that non-fundamental
1In Bambi and Venditti (2016), consumption tax rate are time-varying and government
expenditure is used for production. They show that there exists a unique balanced growth
path but that sunspot equilibria based on self-ful¯lling expectations emerge under counter-
cyclical consumption taxes.
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factors cannot a®ect economic °uctuations.
2 Economy
Representative households solve the dynamic optimisation problem, 2
max
Z 1
0
[cµcg1¡µc ]1¡¾
1¡ ¾ ¡
l1+Â
1 + Â
e¡½tdt; ½ > 0; ¾ > 0; Â ¸ 0; 0 < µc · 1
(1)
subject to
_k = (1¡ ¿y(y))y ¡ (1 + ¹¿c)c; (2)
and the no-Ponzi condition, where ½ is the time discount rate, c private
consumption, k capital, l labour, and ¿y(y) the tax rate on income which
depends on income level y as below. The consumption tax rate ¹¿c(¸ 0) is
constant. The output technology using capital and labour is in the form of
a Cobb-Douglas function,
y = k®l1¡®; 0 < ® < 1: (3)
The amount of government expenditure g included in households' utility
depends on the income and consumption taxes:
¿y(y)¢y + ¹¿c¢c = g: (4)
The income tax rate is formulated as per Guo and Lansing (1998):
¿y(y) = 1¡ ´
µ
¹y
y
¶Á
; ´ 2 (0; 1]; Á < 1: (5)
where ´ is the proportion of disposal income around the steady-state level of
income ¹y. 3 The marginal rate of tax is
¿y(y) + ¿
0
y(y)y = 1¡ ´(1¡ Á)
µ
¹y
y
¶Á
;
2We omit the case where the preference externality is enough high investigated as in
Hori and Maebayashi (2013), in order to focus on the e®ect of ¯scal policy.
3As in Chen and Guo (2016 and 2017), we restrict the lowest Á is
max
·
¡1¡ ®
®
;¡1¡ ´
´
¸
. In addition, we assume Â + ® + (1 ¡ ®)Á > 0. We allow re-
gressive tax, Á < 0, under these conditions. This is di®erent from Chen and Guo (2014)
who postulate 0 < Á < 1, which means that they do not consider regressive income tax.
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and thus
1¡ ¿y(y)¡ ¿ 0y(y)y = ´(1¡ Á)
µ
¹y
y
¶Á
; (6)
The conditions for this optimization are as follows:
µcc
¡[1¡µc(1¡¾)]g(1¡µc)(1¡¾) = ¸[1 + ¹¿c]; (7)
¸[1¡ ¿y(y)¡ ¿ 0y(y)y]
(1¡ ®)y
l
= lÂ; (8)
_¸ =
µ
½¡ [1¡ ¿y(y)¡ ¿ 0y(y)y]
®y
k
¶
¸; (9)
with the transversality condition, where ¸ is a shadow value of capital.
3 Reduced Dynamic System
From Eqs. (3) and (8),
l = [´(1¡ Á)¹y(1¡ ®)k®(1¡Á)¸] 1Â+®+(1¡®)Á ;
and thus output is
y = y(k; ¸) = [f´(1¡ Á)¹y(1¡ ®)g1¡®k®(1+Â)¸1¡®] 1Â+®+(1¡®)Á : (10)
Combining Eqs. (4), (5), and (7), we obtain
µcc
¡[1¡µc(1¡¾)][y(k; ¸)¡ ´¹yÁy(k; ¸)1¡Á + ¹¿c¢c](1¡µc)(1¡¾) = ¸[1 + ¹¿c]; (11)
and thus c = c(k; ¸) which satis¯es around the steady state, 4
ck =
@c
@k
¯¯¯¯
ss
= (1¡µc)(1¡¾)[1¡´(1¡Á)] ®(1 + Â)
Â+ ®+ (1¡ ®)Á
¹y¹c
¹k¹g
·
¾+(1¡µc)(1¡¾)(1¡ ´)¹y
¹g
¸¡1
;
(12)
4From Eq. (11), the following are satis¯ed:
dcss = ¡
·
¾ + (1¡ µc)(1¡ ¾) (1¡ ´)¹y¹g
¸ ¹¸(1 + ¹¿c)
¹c
< 0;
dkss = (1¡ µc)(1¡ ¾)
¹¸(1 + ¹¿c)
¹g
[1¡ ´(1¡ Á)] ®(1 + Â)
Â+ ®+ (1¡ ®)Á
¹y
¹k
;
d¸ss = (1¡ µc)(1¡ ¾)
¹¸(1 + ¹¿c)
¹g
[1¡ ´(1¡ Á)](1¡ ®)
Â+ ®+ (1¡ ®)Á
¹y
¹¸ ¡ (1 + ¹¿c):
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¯¯¯¯
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¹g
¡1
¸
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·
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:
(13)
The following equations constitute the dynamic system, which implies
the goods-market equilibrium condition and the Euler equation:
_k = ´¹yÁy(k; ¸)1¡Á ¡ (1 + ¹¿c)c(k; ¸); (14)
_¸ =
·
½¡ ®´(1¡ Á)¹y
Áy(k; ¸)1¡Á
k
¸
¸: (15)
The coe±cient matrix of the linearised system of the original (14)¡(15)
around the steady state is
J =
·
_kk _k¸
_¸
k
_¸
¸
¸
;
where
_kk =
@ _k
@k
¯¯¯¯
ss
= ´(1¡Á)yk¡ (1+ ¹¿c)ck; _k¸ = @
_k
@¸
¯¯¯¯
ss
= ´(1¡Á)y¸¡ (1+ ¹¿c)c¸;
_¸
k =
@ _¸
@k
¯¯¯¯
ss
= ¡®´(1¡Á)¹¸ (1¡ Á)
¹kyk ¡ ¹y
¹k2
; _¸ ¸ =
@ _¸
@¸
¯¯¯¯
ss
= ¡®´(1¡Á)2 ¹¸y¸¹k ;
and thus
DetJ = ¹1¹2 = _kk ¢ _¸ ¸ ¡ _k¸ ¢ _¸ k =
®´(1¡ Á)(1 + ¹¿c)¹y¹c
¹k2[Â+ ®+ (1¡ ®)Á]
·
¾ + (1¡ µc)(1¡ ¾)(1¡ ´)¹y
¹g
¸¡1
·
¡(Â+ Á) + ®Â(1¡ Á)¡ ¾(1¡ Á)(1¡ ®) + (1¡ µc)(1¡ ¾)(1¡ ®)Á ¹y
¹g
¸
;
(16)
TraceJ = ¹1 + ¹2 = _kk + _¸ ¸
= ½
½
1¡(1¡ µc)(1¡ ¾)[1¡ ´(1¡ Á)](1 + Â)
(1¡ Á)[Â+ ®+ (1¡ ®)Á]
1 + ¹¿c
1¡ ´ + ¹¿c
·
¾+(1¡µc)(1¡¾)(1¡ ´)¹y
¹g
¸¡1¾
;
(17)
because
´¹y
¹k
=
(1 + ¹¿c)¹c
¹k
=
½
®(1¡ Á) ;
¹g
¹k
=
½
®(1¡ Á)
1¡ ´ + ¹¿c
´(1 + ¹¿c)
;
¹y
¹g
=
1 + ¹¿c
1¡ ´ + ¹¿c :
(18)
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Table 1: Determinacy of Equilibrium
Á ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1¡ ¾ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
¹¿y ¡ (1¡ ®)(1¡ µc) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
+¹¿cf®+ µc(1¡ ®)g
determinacy of equilibrium D D, NS, I D D D, NS, I D D D
D = Determinate, NS = Non-Stationarity, I = Indeterminate.
4 Equilibrium Determinacy and Implications
There is one jump variable, ¸, and one predetermined variable, k, in the
dynamic system so that the steady state satis¯es local determinacy, if one
eigenvalue is positive, that is, DetJ = ¹1¹2 < 0. When all eigenvalues ¹1 and
¹2 are positive, non-stationarity holds (TraceJ = ¹1 + ¹2 > 0). Otherwise,
the equilibrium is indeterminate (TraceJ < 0). From Eqs. (16) and (18),
sign[DetJ ] =
sign[¡(¹¿y+¹¿c)(1¡®+®Á)(Â+¾)¡Á(1¡¾)[¹¿y¡(1¡®)(1¡µc)+¹¿cf®+µc(1¡®)g]];
(19)
where ¹¿y ´ 1¡ ´, which implies the standard rate of income tax. Therefore,
results are summarised as the following proposition and Table 1:
Proposition 1 If the sign of Á(1¡¾)[¹¿y¡(1¡®)(1¡µc)+¹¿cf®+µc(1¡®)g] is
non-negative and ¾ > 1, equilibrium is necessarily determinate. Otherwise,
indeterminacy or non-stationarity may emerge.
We intuitively interpret the results in a manner similar to Hori and Mae-
bayashi (2013). Suppose that agents expect higher government spending. If
¾ < 1, that is, government expenditure and private consumption are comple-
ments, the marginal utility of private consumption increases. This accelerates
capital accumulation for future consumption, and thus output and wages rise
while the shadow value of capital becomes lower. This induces higher gov-
ernment spending. When the income tax rate is progressive to income, the
tax rate increases; however, the equilibrium condition may not be violated if
the base tax rates are not su±ciently high to satisfy the preferences to gov-
ernment spending. Therefore, equilibrium may not be determinate in that
the self-ful¯lling expectation as above can be realised. Consumption tax
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can increase the possibility of determinacy since it facilitates increased tax
revenues as the source of government expenditure and then the equilibrium
conditions tend to be violated. Concretely, if
¹¿y ¡ (1¡ ®)(1¡ µc) + ¹¿cf®+ µc(1¡ ®)g = (1 + ¹¿c)
·
¹g
¹y
¡ (1¡ ®)(1¡ µc)
¸
;
in Eq. (19) is positive (resp. negative), the standard tax rates are su±ciently
high (resp. low) to satisfy the preferences to government expenditure. Con-
versely, under the regressive income tax rate, government expenditure can
be larger but the equilibrium condition may hold if the preference weight on
public spending is low relative to the base tax rates, and thus equilibrium
cannot be determinate.
Our results complement Hori and Maebayashi (2013) and Chen and Guo
(2014), in that their results are reasonably robust even if another kind of
tax is levied, but the expansion of policy mechanisms can decrease the risk
of instability under the speci¯c policy setting when one condition slightly
changes. Indeed, this may be the reason why many kinds of tax exist.
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